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a b s t r a c t 
In this paper, we assess the impact of Airbnb on housing rents and prices in the city of Barcelona. Examining very 
detailed data on rents and both transaction and posted prices, we use several econometric approaches that exploit 
the exact timing and geography of Airbnb activity in the city. These include i) panel fixed-effects models, where 
we run multiple specifications that allow for different forms of heterogeneous time trends across neighborhoods, 
ii) an instrumental variables shift-share approach in which tourist amenities predict where Airbnb listings will 
locate and Google searches predict when listings appear, iii) event-study designs, and iv) finally, we present 
evidence from Sagrada Familia , a major tourist amenity that is not found in the city centre. Our main results 
imply that for the average neighborhood, Airbnb activity has increased rents by 1.9%, transaction prices by 4.6% 
and posted prices by 3.7%. The estimated impact in neighborhoods with high Airbnb activity is substantial. For 
neighborhoods in the top decile of Airbnb activity distribution, rents are estimated to have increased by 7%, 
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Tourism has grown enormously in recent decades: between 1990 and
017, the worldwide number of international tourist arrivals increased
rom about 400 million to 1300 million ( WTO, 2018 ). This pattern is
articularly apparent in urban tourism; the number of visitors to the
62 most popular cities in the world has increased on average 6.5%
ach year between 2009 and 2018 ( MasterCard, 2019 ). Home-sharing
eer-to-peer platforms such as Airbnb have recently entered the mar-
et, partly accommodating the increased demand for tourism in cities.
s a consequence, they have contributed to increasing the overlap be-
ween tourism and housing markets by allowing owners of residential
roperties to enter the hospitality sector. 
Proponents of home-sharing platforms argue that short-term rentals
rovide residents with an additional source of income while decen-
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1 Similarly, the hotel industry views home-sharing platforms as a threat to fair com
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ome-sharing platforms can be seen as an efficiency improvement
n markets where goods are not fully used ( Barron et al., 2020 ). For
xample, empty apartments during holiday periods are efficiency
osses that can be reduced through short-term rentals. However, if
ome-sharing platforms are used by owners to permanently shift from
ong-term to short-term rentals for tourists, the supply of units in the
ong-term market is reduced, increasing housing prices and rents.
ritics of home-sharing platforms emphasize that short-term rental
nits in residential areas might constitute a negative externality for
esidents in terms of noise or uncivil behavior and cause displacement
f long-term residents. 1 Complaints about touristification effects and
uisances have resulted in local policy implementation that limits the
xpansion of platforms such as Airbnb. Such policy responses include
ermit requirements (Barcelona, Berlin, Paris, San Francisco, and Lospetition. Zervas et al. (2017) empirically studies the effect of Airbnb on hotel 
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Table 1 
Airbnb activity in 2015 in selected cities. 
Barcelona New York Los Angeles Paris 
Airbnb Listings 16,951 45,260 30,000 35,000 
as % of total units 2.06 1.31 0.86 2.56 
as % of rented units 6.84 1.92 1.56 4.97 
Average Airbnb price/day ( €) 71 131 114 81 
Long-term rent/day ( €) 11 59 75 37 
Days/month for same revenue 10 14 20 14 
Notes: Data on Barcelona comes from Cadastral Records and INCASOL, data on New York and Los Angeles comes 
from US Census Bureau, Zillow Rent Index and airdna , and data for Paris comes from INSEE and OLAP. All Airbnb 























































































r  ngeles), limiting the rental period (Amsterdam, New York, Paris, and
an Francisco), paying a rental tax (Amsterdam and San Francisco), or
utlawing short-term rentals under some conditions (Berlin and New
ork). Despite all these local policy responses, we still have limited
vidence on the effect of home-sharing platforms on housing markets. 
In this paper, we analyze the effects of the arrival and expansion of
irbnb in Barcelona. Barcelona is ideal to study the effects of Airbnb
n local housing markets for several reasons. First, Barcelona has expe-
ienced rapid tourism growth. The number of passengers in the city’s
irport increased from 20 to 47 million between 2000 and 2017. It is
he 7th most visited destination city in Europe, measured by overnight
isitors, and the 17th worldwide ( MasterCard, 2019 ). Second, Airbnb ac-
ounts for the majority of short-term rental activity in the city, far ahead
f its competitors. 2 Third, Airbnb penetration in Barcelona is high, with
arcelona being Airbnb’s 6th top destination worldwide. 3 
Table 1 compares the number of Airbnb listings in Barcelona, New
ork, Los Angeles and Paris in 2015. Despite substantial legal uncertain-
ies regarding the use of home-sharing platforms in Barcelona, about
.06% of all housing units are listed on Airbnb. 4 This figure is higher
han in New York (1.31%) and Los Angeles (0.86%), and slightly smaller
han Paris (2.56%). However, if we measure Airbnb listings relative to
he number of rented units, the percentage for Barcelona rises to 6.84%,
 figure significantly higher than the other cities. 5 This high penetration
f Airbnb in Barcelona is likely to be explained by the (large) differ-
nce between the returns of short-term and long-term rentals. At the
ottom of Table 1 , we provide estimates of the difference in revenue
etween Airbnb and long-term rentals. In 2015, the average long-term
ental price in Barcelona was € 11 per night ( € 735 per month), while the
verage Airbnb price (short-term rental) was € 71 per night. An Airbnb
isting yields the monthly income of a long-term rental in just 10 days
f occupancy. 
To guide the empirical analysis and to clarify the underlying mecha-
isms of the Airbnb effect on residential housing markets, we develop a
tylized model where owners can decide to rent long-term to residents or
hort-term to tourists. The model predicts that Airbnb will increase hous-
ng prices and rents, with the effect on rents being larger than for prices.
n terms of testable implications regarding mechanisms, the model pre-
icts that Airbnb reduces the long-term supply of residential housing
nits. 
2 For Barcelona, Airbnb’s market share is around 70% according to the DataHippo 
roject ( https://datahippo.org/es/ ) which collects data from several home-sharing plat- 
orms since 2017. We do not use this data-set because it does not cover the period of 
tudy. 
3 ‘You’ll never guess which city has the most Airbnb listings’. Forbes. J Bishop 2017. 
4 Barcelona’s regulation of short-term rental platforms has not substantially changed 
uring recent years. A city law passed in 2007 (Housing Rights Act 18/2007) states that 
ourist apartments that are neither primary nor secondary residences are required to have 
 business activity permit. When Airbnb first arrived in Barcelona around 2009, the short- 
erm rentals of entire apartments without a permit were illegal. Nevertheless, enforce- 
ent of the law was very low until 2016, when the number of inspections substantially 
ncreased. 
5 Compared to traditional tourist accommodation, the number of active listings was 












To study the effect of Airbnb listings on residential housing markets,
e combine publicly available web-scraped data on Airbnb listings in
arcelona with high-quality data on housing rents and real estate prices.
e have access to i) individual-level data on the universe of transac-
ions of second-hand apartments sold in the 2009–2017 period and ii)
ll posted ads for rentals and sales from a major real estate website (Ide-
lista) that were active each December in the 2007–2017 period. We
ggregate the information at the geographical level of small neighbor-
oods, which leaves us with a panel dataset of 221 small geographical
reas that have an average population of about 7000 inhabitants. 
Throughout the empirical analysis, our dependent variable is the
verage residual resulting from a hedonic regression in which the log
f housing rents or real estate prices are regressed on time dummies
nd unit characteristics. In all regressions, we control for neighborhood
nd time fixed effects. Since Airbnb has grown the most in central parts
f the city, our main identification concern is that neighborhoods that
xperienced higher Airbnb penetration might be simultaneously expe-
iencing processes of urban revival. 6 Aside from controlling for time-
arying neighborhood socioeconomic characteristics that are associated
ith gentrification processes, we adopt several strategies to account for
he potential unobserved confounding effects of urban revival. 
First, we estimate panel fixed-effects specifications that allow neigh-
orhoods to have different time trends. We run i) specifications that
nclude interaction terms between baseline neighborhood characteris-
ics (including the distance to the city centre) and a time trend (either
inear or quadratic), ii) specifications that include interaction terms be-
ween these same neighborhood characteristics and (the log of) aggre-
ate regional GDP, iii) specifications that fit neighborhood-specific time
rends (either linear or quadratic), and iv) specifications on detrended
ata, where the outcome is measured as the deviation from its pre-2013
xtended linear trend. 
Second, we apply an IV strategy, where the instrument is the inter-
ction between i) a measure of proximity to the city’s tourist amenities
t the neighborhood level and ii) a Google Trends measure that tracks
hanges in Airbnb activity over time. The proximity to tourist amenities
redicts Airbnb listing locations, while searches for Airbnb in Google
redict when these listings are posted. We indirectly verify the exclusion
estriction by showing that proximity to tourist amenities does not pre-
ict rent and price growth in the pre-Airbnb period (i.e., before 2013). 
Third, we also estimate event-study regressions. Specifically, we es-
imate interaction terms between year dummies and a continuous mea-
ure of Airbnb activity in 2016. This approach allows us to directly check
f housing markets in neighborhoods that experienced a high Airbnb
enetration after 2012 were evolving similarly prior to the expansion of
irbnb as compared to the rest of the city. 6 For the US, processes of urban revival have been described and studied by Baum- 
now and Hartley (2020) ; Couture and Handbury (2020) , while Behrens et al. (2018) fo- 
us on the changes in local businesses associated with gentrification processes. González- 
ampillón et al. (2019) provide some evidence of gentrification in the city center of 
arcelona. 
























































































































Finally, we study rent and price dynamics around one specific lo-
ation, Sagrada Familia , one of the main tourist attractions in the city.
hile Airbnb activity is high around Sagrada Familia , it is outside the
ity centre. The results for Sagrada Familia are less prone to be con-
ounded by urban revival dynamics affecting the most central parts of
he city. 
All the empirical approaches yield results that are qualitatively and
uantitatively similar, and are consistent with the predictions of our
odel. Airbnb has increased both rents and prices. Our preferred speci-
cation results suggest that 54 more active listings in a small neighbor-
ood (about the average level in 2016) increase rents by 1.9%, while
ransaction and posted prices increase by 4.6% and 3.7%, respectively.
owever, our estimates imply that local impacts can be substantial in
he most touristy parts of the city. Our results imply that an increase
f 200 listings (the average number of listings in the top decile of the
irbnb activity distribution in 2016) increase rents by 7% and trans-
ction and posted prices by 17% and 14%, respectively. We also show
hat Airbnb listings reduce the number of resident households in the
eighborhood. 
Despite Airbnb being a recent phenomenon, there are already some
esearch papers that estimate the effect of Airbnb on housing markets.
arron et al. (2020) and Koster et al. (2020) are the two papers that are
he most similar to our study. Barron et al. (2020) look at the impact
f Airbnb on rents and house prices for all cities in the US. 7 Their main
trategy consists of using a ‘shift-share’ instrument, where the time vari-
tion comes from Google Trends of ‘Airbnb’ searches, while the cross-
ectional variation is a neighborhood ‘touristiness’ index based on the
ocation of restaurants. They find that a 1% increase in Airbnb listings
ncreases rents by 0.018% and housing prices by 0.026%. Koster et al.
2020) study the effects of Airbnb bans implemented by several, but
ot all, local governments in the Los Angeles area. Exploiting changes
n prices at the administrative border, they find that banning Airbnb
ecreases prices by about 5%. 
Compared to Koster et al. (2020) , our paper focuses on a different
hannel through which Airbnb affects housing markets. In Koster et al.
2020) the use a spatial RD design, which compares changes in prices
cross municipality borders following Airbnb bans. This neatly identifies
he price increase of a property due to the possibility of using Airbnb.
owever, properties located across a border might be part of the same
ousing market, and, their spatial RD estimates do not capture changes
n rents and prices that are caused by supply reductions. As Koster et al.
2020) point out, rents should be smooth at the border. The supply chan-
el is of great interest from a policy perspective, as rent increases caused
y Airbnb are among the main complaints made by critics of short-term
ental platforms. 
Calder-Wang (2020) and Almagro and Domínguez-Lino (2020) adopt
tructural approaches to estimate the effects of Airbnb on the welfare of
eterogeneous residents. Calder-Wang (2020) develops a model where
bsentee landlords can choose to rent either short-term (to tourists) or
ong-term (to residents) and where residents can also host by temporar-
ly renting their home. In the model, estimated with data from New
ork, Airbnb affects residents’ welfare trough two different channels. A
ent channel, that comes from rent increases, following the reduction
f long-term supply, and a host channel, since residents are allowed to
ollect income by renting their homes. Her results show that renters’ net
elfare effect is negative since the rent channel dominates the host chan-
el. She finds that rent increases are widespread across the city, even
n neighbourhoods with low Airbnb activity, due to spillover effects.
n terms of distributional effects, rent increases are particularly high
or high-income, highly-educated people whose preferences are more
ligned with tourists. Moreover, host gains are concentrated in a small7 An earlier contribution is Sheppard and Udell (2016) that focuses on New York City. 
heir results suggest that doubling Airbnb in a 300-meter circle around a property trans- 




raction of residents with low hosting costs. Almagro and Domínguez-
ino (2020) set up a dynamic spatial equilibrium model of residential
hoice and estimate it with data from Amsterdam. The model features
ultiple endogenous amenities that include the congestion effects of
ourism as well as services provided by monopolistically competitive
rms. The authors emphasize that endogenizing neighborhood amenity
ormation is key to understand the nature and welfare consequences of
patial sorting. Unlike the structural approach of these two studies, our
ocus produces reduced-form estimates that are shown to be robust to
ultiple identification threats. 
We contribute to the literature in several ways. First, we focus on
 city where the difference in returns between Airbnb and long-term
entals is large, resulting in high levels of Airbnb activity. Second, we
rovide estimates from four different identification strategies that yield
ualitatively and quantitatively similar results that cross-validate each
ther. This is particularly true for rental prices, where all our estimates
ndicate that the average impact of Airbnb on rents is between 1% and
%. Third, we have access to multiple high-quality micro-level data sets
o track granular changes in housing rents, and posted and transaction
rices. These micro-level data sets allow us to measure changes in rents
nd housing prices net of composition changes in rented or sold units,
hich is not possible when working with neighborhood average rents or
rices. Fourth, we provide direct evidence on the supply mechanism by
howing that Airbnb actually reduces the number of households living
n the neighborhood. Fifth, this is the first study to carefully estimate
he effects of Airbnb in the context of a large European city 8 This is rel-
vant given the underlying differences between European and US cities.
or instance, European cities might have less excess capacity, where
uest houses or basement apartments (below a main house) are virtu-
lly nonexistent. For the case of Barcelona, our analysis below shows
hat only a small proportion of housing units active on Airbnb are pri-
ary residences. Despite these differences, the results that we find are
emarkably close to those found in Barron et al. (2020) . 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 , we develop the
tylized model that studies the effects of short-term rentals on residen-
ial housing markets. Section 3 describes the Airbnb, rents and housing
rices data and describes the most relevant variables. A description of
ur empirical strategies is provided in Section 4 . The main results are
resented and discussed in Section 5 , while Section 6 contains the in-
trumental variables and event-study results. Finally, some concluding
emarks are provided in Section 7 . 
. Theoretical framework 
In this section we develop a theoretical framework to understand
ow short-term rentals to tourists can affect the residential market for
ong-term rentals. The model also guides our empirical analysis in terms
f model specification, threats to identification, estimation strategies
nd interpretation of the results. 
.1. Model set-up 
There are two neighborhoods: a central neighborhood c with fixed
ize C , and a suburban neighborhood s , with a housing supply curve
hich is not completely inelastic. All units in the city are owned by ab-
entee owners. In the centre, owners can rent their units to residents (on
 long-term basis) or to tourists (on a short-term basis). 9 In contrast, the
uburban neighborhood s only hosts residents. The masses of residents
nd tourists have been normalized to one and each individual consumes
ne unit of housing. 8 Although not the main aim in Almagro and Domínguez-Lino (2020) , the authors use 
 shift-share instrumental variables approach that indicates that Airbnb activity increased 
ents in Amsterdam. 
9 Note that the model leaves out resident home owners as it focuses on the competition 
or housing between tourists and renters. 



































































































n  .2. Owner choices 
Owners in neighborhood c can rent their apartments through a long-
erm rental to a resident and obtain an annual market rent Q c or, al-
ernatively, rent short-term to tourists and obtain an annual rent of T .
ach owner j , who owns one unit, faces a cost b j to rent short-term to
ourists, which reflects the legal uncertainties or the costs of running
n Airbnb business. The term b j is heterogeneous across owners since
hey can differ in their risk aversion towards legal uncertainties or their
ccess to legal services. If 𝑇 − 𝑏 𝑗 > 𝑄 𝑐 , the owner rents short-term to
ourists, while if 𝑇 − 𝑏 𝑗 ≤ 𝑄 𝑐 , the owner rents long-term to a resident.
he cost b j allows T to exceed Q 
c in equilibrium, which is a salient fea-
ure of the data for the case of Barcelona. In equilibrium, there is a
arginal owner who is indifferent between renting to residents or to
ourists, 𝑇 − 𝑏 ∗ 
𝑗 
= 𝑄 𝑐 , which implies that owners with 𝑏 𝑗 < 𝑏 ∗ 𝑗 rent short-
erm, while those with 𝑏 𝑗 ≥ 𝑏 ∗ 𝑗 rent long-term. Hence, 𝑏 ∗ 𝑗 is the share of
nits in neighborhood c that are rented on a short-term basis. 
.3. Resident and tourist choices 
The utility that resident i obtains in neighborhood c is 𝑈 𝑐 
𝑖𝑟 
= 𝐴 𝑟 −
 
𝑐 − 𝛼𝐹 𝑏 ( 𝑏 ∗ 𝑗 ) + 𝑒 𝑖𝑟 , where A r reflects the residents’ valuation of amenities
f neighborhood c, Q c is the rental price, while 𝛼𝐹 𝑏 ( 𝑏 ∗ 𝑗 ) is a term reflect-
ng the negative externality that tourism can impose on residents due
o noise or uncivil behavior. 10 , 11 Finally, e ir is an idiosyncratic term re-
ecting the relative preference of resident i to live in neighborhood c as
pposed to neighborhood s . The utility level that resident i would obtain
n neighborhood s is 𝑈 𝑠 
𝑖𝑟 
= − 𝑄 𝑠 , where we normalize to zero the value of
menities in neighborhood s . The willingness to pay of the marginal res-
dent to live in neighborhood c is 𝑄 𝑐 ( 𝑒 ∗ 
𝑖𝑟 
) = 𝐴 𝑟 − 𝛼𝐹 𝑏 ( 𝑏 ∗ 𝑗 ) + 𝑒 
∗ 
𝑖𝑟 
+ 𝑄 𝑠 , with
veryone with 𝑒 𝑖𝑟 > 𝑒 
∗ 
𝑖𝑟 
living in the centre and everyone with 𝑒 𝑖𝑟 ≤ 𝑒 ∗ 𝑖𝑟 
iving in the suburbs. 
The utility that tourist i obtains if staying in a short-term rental in
eighborhood c is 𝑈 𝑐 
𝑖𝑡 
= 𝐴 𝑡 − 𝑇 + 𝑒 𝑖𝑡 , where A t reflects the tourists’ valu-
tion of amenities in neighborhood c , and e it is an idiosyncratic term re-
ecting the preference of tourist i to stay in a short-term rental in neigh-
orhood c . As in Almagro and Domínguez-Lino (2020) , residents and
ourists might value amenities differently. Tourists have a fixed reserva-
ion utility level 𝑈 0 𝑡 = 0 , which could reflect the possibility to stay at a
otel or visit another city. The willingness to pay of the marginal tourist
o stay in a short-term rental in neighborhood c is 𝑇 ( 𝑒 ∗ 
𝑖𝑡 
) = 𝐴 𝑡 + 𝑒 ∗ 𝑖𝑡 , with
nly those tourists with 𝑒 𝑖𝑡 > 𝑒 
∗ 
𝑖𝑡 
staying in a short-term rental unit in the
entre. 
.4. The equilibrium units in short-term rentals 
Without loss of generality, we assume that b j , e ir and e it are U ~ (0,
), which simplifies the market clearing conditions in neighborhood c .
 − 𝑒 ∗ 
𝑖𝑟 
and 1 − 𝑒 ∗ 
𝑖𝑡 
are the shares of residents and tourists who stay in
he central neighbourhood c . We write 𝐶𝑏 ∗ 
𝑗 
= 1 − 𝑒 ∗ 
𝑖𝑡 
which ensures that
emand for short-term rentals equals its supply, while market clearing
or long-term rentals implies 𝐶(1 − 𝑏 ∗ 
𝑗 
) = 1 − 𝑒 ∗ 
𝑖𝑟 
. In neighborhood s , the
ong-term rental price is assumed to be an increasing function of its
opulation. Specifically, we posit that 𝑄 𝑠 = 𝛾 𝑒 ∗ 
𝑖𝑟 
, with 𝛾 > 0. Combining
he market clearing conditions, the willingness to pay of the marginal
esident and tourist, 𝑄 𝑐 ( 𝑒 ∗ ) and 𝑇 ( 𝑒 ∗ ) , and the definition of the marginal𝑖𝑟 𝑖𝑡 
10 Tourism as a negative externality is in line with the local population’s perception of 
ourism as a negative phenomena in Barcelona. This is documented by an opinion poll 
ade by local authorities since 2011, which surveys citizen perception of Barcelona’s 
ost important problems. In this poll, tourism was mentioned, on average, as the city’s 
ourth largest problem during the entire period, reaching the top ranking in 2017. 
11 Almagro and Domínguez-Lino (2020) posit that tourism affects residents through a 
irect negative effect and indirectly by changing the availability of non-tradable goods 








wner, 𝑇 − 𝑏 ∗ 
𝑗 
= 𝑄 𝑐 , we obtain the share of owners that rent short-term




( 𝐴 𝑡 − 𝐴 𝑟 ) + 𝐶 − 𝛾(1 − 𝐶) 
2 𝐶 + (1 − 𝛼) + 𝛾( 𝐶 ) 
(1)
Eq. 1 indicates that the main driver of the penetration of Airbnb in
 central neighborhood is the tourists’ valuation of amenities relative to
he resident’s valuation ( 𝐴 𝑡 − 𝐴 𝑟 ). 12 
.5. Rental prices 
The equilibrium price of long-term rentals can be obtained by insert-
ng the market clearing conditions 𝐶(1 − 𝑏 ∗ 
𝑗 
) = 1 − 𝑒 ∗ 
𝑖𝑟 
and 𝑄 𝑠 = 𝛾 𝑒 ∗ 
𝑖𝑟 
in
he residents’ willingness to pay function: 
 𝑐 = (1 − 𝐶)(1 + 𝛾) + 𝐴 𝑟 + ( 𝐶 + 𝛾 𝐶 − 𝛼) 𝑏 ∗ 𝑗 (2)
Eq. 2 indicates that the number of units in the short-term rental mar-
et affect long-term rents through three different mechanisms. First, one
dditional unit in the short-term market reduces the number of long-
erm residents, which mechanically increases the willingness to pay of
he marginal resident as the market clearing condition reveals. Reduc-
ng the supply of long-term units increases prices. The second term is
 second order general equilibrium effect. An increase in 𝑏 ∗ 
𝑗 
displaces
esidents from neighborhood c to s , increasing rental prices in the sub-
rbs as equation 𝑄 𝑠 = 𝛾 𝑒 ∗ 
𝑖𝑟 
reveals. Rents can increase in areas with lit-
le to no Airbnb listings as emphasized in Calder-Wang (2020) . A higher
ental price in neighborhood s makes neighborhood c relatively more at-
ractive, further increasing rents in neighborhood c . Finally, a marginal
ncrease in 𝑏 ∗ 
𝑗 
means higher negative externalities, which contribute to
ower long-term rents. Provided that these externalties are not too large,
he overall effect of Airbnb on rents will be positive. 
.6. Housing prices 
To relate rents and housing prices, we follow the approach of
arron et al. (2020) . The market is assumed to be in a steady state,
nd the price of a housing unit ( P c ) is given by the present value of

















𝑄 𝑐 + ( 𝑇 − 𝑄 𝑐 ) 𝑏 ∗ 𝑗 − 






Assuming 𝛿 as the discount factor, the cash flow in each period re-
ects the fact that 1 − 𝑏 ∗ 
𝑗 
units are rented long-term at price Q c , and 𝑏 ∗ 
𝑗 
nits are rented in the short-term market at rate T paying the cost b j .
q. 3 indicates that the effects of Airbnb on housing prices ( P c ) will be
arger than those on rents ( Q c ), as part of the stock available for rent
btains a return of 𝑇 − 𝑏 𝑗 that is higher than Q c . 
.7. Implications for the empirical analysis 
Eqs. 2 and 3 motivate our empirical analysis consisting of relating
hanges in housing rents or prices with changes in Airbnb activity at the
eighborhood level. From the theoretical framework developed here, we
raw five implications for the empirical analysis. 
First, the model predicts that Airbnb activity increases rents and
rices, with the effect on prices being larger in absolute value. 
Second, inspecting Eqs. 1–3 reveal the main identification threat
aced in the empirical analysis. The effect of Airbnb activity on resi-
ential housing markets will be biased if neighborhoods where Airbnb12 For 0 ≤ 𝑏 ∗ 
𝑗 
≤ 1 , it has to be the case that 𝛾(1 − 𝐶) − 𝐶 ≤ ( 𝐴 𝑡 − 𝐴 𝑛 ) ≤ 𝐶 + 1 − 
+ 𝛾. 


































































































14 Although some guests do not leave a review, there are no reasons to believe that the 
percentage of guests that leave a review changes non-randomly across space or time. 
15 An alternative approach would be to use the entry date and assume that listings never 
exit, which is the preferred method in Barron et al. (2020) . In the case of Barcelona, we 
consider that this approach is problematic. First, approximately 25% of all listings do not 
have any reviews at all. Second, the entry date indicates the time when the host registered. 
If the host has multiple listings (which is the case for the majority of listings in Barcelona), 
it is not possible to know the entry date of each listing. 
16 This practice increased after July 2016. Short-term rentals of entire apartments without 
a permit is illegal, but enforcement was very low before July 2016. It is less clear if renting 
a private room is also against the law, and in practice, enforcement with respect to private 
rooms has been low throughout the period we study. 
17 We keep only those sales transactions with a declared value of less than 10,000,000 
euros. 
18 We have dropped the following data: sales ads with posted prices below 10,000 euros 
and those of less than 20 square meters, and we drop all ads with monthly rents below 
100 euros or above 30,000 euros. enetration is high are simultaneously experiencing changes in the resi-
ents’ willingness to pay. It could be that neighborhoods where A t is high
re becoming increasingly popular among residents. Central neighbor-
oods where Airbnb activity is higher are going through gentrification
rocesses. We will extensively address these concerns in the empirical
nalysis. 
Third, besides the increase in rents (and prices), the model indicates
hat Airbnb reduces the supply of units in the long-term rental market.
s a consequence, the model predicts that Airbnb displaces residents.
o test the model’s main mechanism we will also estimate the effect of
irbnb activity on the number of resident households. 
Fourth, as we have seen above, Eq. 1 predicts that the penetration of
irbnb is (partly) determined by the presence of neighborhood ameni-
ies that are more important to tourists than they are to residents. In
ection 4.2 we document that, the proximity to relevant tourist attrac-
ions is a strong predictor of Airbnb activity at the neighborhood level.
his observation motivates the instrumental variables strategy devel-
ped in Section 4.2 . 
Fifth, our empirical analysis essentially estimates the effect of Airbnb
y comparing changes in rents (or prices) between neighborhoods with
igh versus low Airbnb activity. Subtracting Q s from Eq. 2 yields: 
 
𝑐 − 𝑄 𝑠 = (1 − 𝐶) + 𝐴 𝑟 + ( 𝐶 − 𝛼) 𝑏 ∗ 𝑗 (4)
Eq. 4 reveals that rent comparisons between neighborhoods with dif-
erent levels of Airbnb penetration provides a lower bound of the total
ffect of Airbnb. Differences in rents (or prices) net-out the second-order
eneral equilibrium effects that increase rents and prices throughout the
ity. 
. Data and variables 
.1. Neighborhood definition 
Our geographical unit of analysis is the Basic Statistical Area (BSA).
SAs are built and used by the Barcelona City Hall for statistical pur-
oses. There are a total of 233 BSAs with an average of 7122 inhabitants,
ut due to data restrictions we keep 221 BSAs in our sample. We believe
hat BSAs are the appropriate neighborhood definition, as they are de-
igned to contain population with similar socio-economic characteristics
nd their size is sufficient to generate meaningful measures of housing
ents and prices for neighborhoods over time. 
.2. Airbnb 
To measure Airbnb activity, we use information extracted directly
rom the Airbnb website. InsideAirbnb is a dataset collected at differ-
nt points in time by Murray Cox, an independent Internet user who
as made it publicly available. For Barcelona, it contains 21 data points
etween April 2015 and February 2018. 13 Each listing has information
n the host ID, geographical coordinates, room characteristics, date the
ost registered, and date of each guest review. Even though Airbnb is
ot the only home-sharing platform active in the city, we consider that
ts listings are a good proxy for the short-term rental market. Its market
hare is by far the highest among its competitors and most short-term
entals are advertised through more than one platform simultaneously,
mplying that adding listings from a second platform would cause sig-
ificant double counting. 
For our purposes, it is crucial to identify a listing’s active period.
ven though the information started being scraped in early 2015, by





ctivity prior to 2015 (as well as in between the rest of the data points).
his strategy is supported by the fact that, according to Airbnb, 72%
f guests leave a review. 14 We follow Zervas et al. (2017) and consider
hat a listing is active in a given quarter if it has received at least one
eview during that quarter. 15 
The potential consequences of Airbnb might be very different if the
latform is used to rent out excess capacity (home-sharing), or if units
re rented short-term through Airbnb all year long. We label listings
hat correspond to this second category as ‘commercial’. Listings in
irbnb are entire apartments, private rooms or shared rooms . We consider
ulti-hosted properties (host has more than one listing) and single-
osted entire apartments with a minimum of 5 reviews per quarter to
e commercial. This definition is clearly conservative, as many entire
roperties are rented as separate private rooms . 16 Despite this, more
han 75% of all listings in every single year in our sample correspond
o this commercial category. Although some genuine home-sharing
xists on the platform, Airbnb in Barcelona is mostly a commercial
ctivity. 
.3. Rents and prices 
We use two sources of data to obtain information on rents and prices
t a fine spatial level. In particular, we have two measures for prices
transaction prices and posted prices) and one measure for rents (posted
ents). For transaction prices, we use data from the Catalan Tax Author-
ty from transaction tax records, which includes the price, exact location,
ate of transaction, size of the housing unit, year of construction, and a
ariable reflecting the quality of the dwelling. We have the universe of
ransactions that occurred in Barcelona during the period 2009–2017. 17 
e label this dataset ITP ( Impuesto sobre Transmisiones Patrimoniales ) or
ransaction prices. 
For posted rents and prices, we use information from the online real
state portal Idealista. With more than one million ads and an average of
7 million weekly views, Idealista is by far the most important Spanish
eal estate portal. Idealista provided us with all ads that were active for
he city of Barcelona in December of every year for the period 2007–
017 18 , 19 The data include the exact location, the posted rent or price
nd the size of the unit, among other characteristics 20 
Having two measures of prices is useful because both transaction and
osted prices have advantages and disadvantages. Posted prices might
iffer from final prices since bargaining is a regular part of the process.
fficial transaction prices should, in principle, measure prices more pre-
isely. However, in practice, the transaction (ITP) data have two limi-
ations. First, there might be a non-negligible time lapse between the19 Idealista’s monthly aggregate data for Barcelona show little seasonality, indicating 
hat using December data should not be a limitation in our context. 
20 Other characteristics that are available and that we use are number of floors, num- 
er of rooms, presence of air-conditioning, lift and boxroom, and whether it is a studio, 
enthouse, or duplex. 
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Fig. 1. Airbnb listings, rents and prices: 2007–2017. Notes: This graph plots the 
evolution over time of the BSA averages in Airbnb listings, rents and posted 
prices (per square meter) for the period 2007–2017. Rents and prices are nor- 
malized to their 2013 value. The dark gray bars represent the average Airbnb 
listings for all BSA, while the light gray bars depict the average listings for High 





































Fig. 2. Airbnb activity across BSAs in 2016. Notes: This graph plots the number 





























22 ate at which parties agree on a price and the date when the ITP tax is
aid. Second, there is some fraud in the ITP tax that consists of under-
eporting the ITP price and the tax base. For rents, we cannot compare
osted to actual rents. However, Chapelle and Eymeoud (2018) show,
n the French context, that bargaining is less of an issue for rents and
hat online posted prices are a good measure of actual rents. 
.4. Descriptive statistics 
In Fig. 1 , we plot the evolution over time of Airbnb activity, together
ith that of rents and prices. Airbnb experienced a very rapid increase
rom its first entrance in 2009 up to 2016, when the growth stopped
ecause of City Hall’s increased efforts to reduce tourist apartments op-
rating without a license. In 2016, the average BSA had 54 listings, while
igh Airbnb Areas (those BSAs in the top decile) had an average of 200
ctive listings. In these areas of the city, approximately 5% of all hous-
ng units are listed on Airbnb. The substantial variation in Airbnb activ-
ty across neighborhoods is further explored in Fig. 2 , which shows the
istribution of Airbnb listings across BSAs for the last quarter of 2016.
irbnb activity is higher around the city center and, to some extent,
long portions of the beach line or around the Sagrada Familia . Airbnb
ctivity is low in many other parts of the city. 
The evolution of housing rents and prices in the period we study
s turbulent. Following the financial crisis and the burst of the Spanish
ousing bubble, rents and prices fell until 2013, when they started re-
overing as the economy started to grow. While prices reached pre-crisis
evels towards the end of the period, rents surpassed pre-crisis levels
round 2015 and kept rising. During this period, housing affordability
as one of the main concerns among residents. 21 The recovery of rents
nd prices coincides in time with the return of economic growth and
he expansion of Airbnb. We address the endogeneity concerns related
o this coincidence in the empirical section. 
We complement the data on rents, prices and Airbnb listings with
 comprehensive set of socioeconomic BSA characteristics including
opulation, age distribution, relative income index, average household
ize, unemployment level and the percentage of foreign population. In






he years 2012 and 2016 for two different samples: all BSAs and High
irbnb Areas (BSAs in the top decile of the Airbnb listings distribution
n 2016). 
. Empirical strategies 
.1. Baseline specification 
Our main analysis consists of estimating the following fixed-effects
pecification (and variants of it): 
og ( 𝑌 𝑛,𝑡 ) = 𝛽𝐴𝑖𝑟𝑏𝑛𝑏 𝐶 𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝑛,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑋 𝑛,𝑡 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜇𝑛 + 𝜀 𝑛,𝑡 (5)
here Y n,t is our measure of housing rents or prices at the BSA level,
irbnb Count n,t is the number of active listings at time t in BSA n, 𝜏 t are
ime fixed-effects, and 𝜇n are BSA fixed effects that account for time-
nvariant neighborhood characteristics. Our dependent variable log ( Y n,t )
s the average residual at the BSA-time period level of a (micro-level)
egression in which log rents (or log housing prices) are regressed on
ime dummies and unit characteristics. 22 This controls for price changes
cross neighborhoods that could be explained by changes in the compo-
ition of units rented or sold across BSAs and over time. For example,
t allows us to control for BSAs that might have a growing proportion
f high-end apartments being sold or rented over time. Throughout the
egression analyses, we weight BSA-time cells by the relevant number
f ads or sales. Standard errors are clustered at the BSA level to account
or serial correlation within panel units ( Bertrand et al., 2004 ). 
Our main concern regarding identification is that neighborhoods
ith the most Airbnb activity growth during our period of study might
e experiencing processes of sociodemographic change, which might
ave a direct impact on housing rents and prices. Airbnb has grown
he most in central parts of the city that have also been experiencing
rocesses of urban revival in the last two decades. We adopt severalWe construct a panel on the BSA-year (data from Idealista) and BSA-quarter (transac- 
ion prices). Unit characteristics in the Idealista database are size, number of floors, num- 
er of rooms, air-conditioning, lift and boxroom, and whether it is a studio, penthouse, or 
uplex. In the ITP database, dwelling characteristics are size, year of construction, and a 
ariable reflecting the quality of the dwelling (with scale 1 to 8). 
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Table 2 
Descriptive statistics: Variables’ means across BSAs for 2012 and 2016. 
2012 2016 
All High All High 
BSAs Airbnb Areas BSAs Airbnb Areas 
Airbnb Count 2.79 13.35 47.84 178.58 
Rent ( € / m 2 ) 11.83 12.93 16.39 20.19 
Posted Price ( € / m 2 ) 3250 3338 3753 4282 
Transaction Price ( € / m 2 ) 2269 2356 2619 3027 
Population 6978 7750 6973 7514 
Population Density 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 
Mean Age 43.36 42.10 43.69 42.08 
% of Foreign Population 0.18 0.32 0.17 0.33 
Household Size 2.47 2.41 2.48 2.41 
Unemployment Rate 10.48 10.81 7.80 7.83 
Income Index 98.37 96.48 102.78 104.58 
Notes: Columns 1 and 3 report the mean for all BSAs in 2012 and 2016. Columns 2 and 4 report the means of High 








































Fig. 3. Location of tourist amenities. Notes: Location of tourist amenities across 
the city, the size of the circles is proportional to the number of reviews. The 













p  trategies to control for the potential confounding effects of gentrifica-
ion. 
First, we introduce in Eq. 5 a set of time-varying controls at the BSA
evel ( X n,t ); average age, log of population density, average household
ize, unemployment rate, relative income, and percentage of foreign res-
dents. Since this equation includes BSA-fixed effects, this allows us to
ontrol for yearly changes in variables associated with processes of gen-
rification. In some specifications, we allow for neighborhoods with dif-
erent characteristics to have different time trends (linear or quadratic).
e do so by introducing, as additional regressors, interaction terms be-
ween the time trend and the control variables measured in 2012, i.e.,
 n ,2012 × t in the linear case or X n ,2012 × t and X n ,2012 × t 2 in the quadratic
ase. In this specification, we also include the interaction term between
he time trend and the distance to the city center. 23 This would allow,
or instance, more central neighborhoods to have a steeper time trend. 
Second, in a more data demanding approach, we include BSA-
pecific time trends (linear or quadratic). Specifically, we add 𝜌n × t
nteraction terms for the linear case and 𝜌𝑛 × 𝑡 + 𝜓 𝑛 × 𝑡 2 for the quadratic
ase. This is a very flexible specification since it allows each BSA to have
ts own time trajectory in housing rents and prices. Here, the variations
hat we exploit are deviations from each BSA’s own specific linear (or
uadradic) time trend. 
If Airbnb affects not only levels but also trends of these variables,
ncluding BSA-specific time trends would not be appropriate since it
ould capture both the effect of Airbnb and BSA-specific time trends
 Wolfers, 2006 ). We resort to a detrending procedure previously applied
n the taxation ( Kleven et al., 2014 ) and minimum wage ( Monras, 2019 )
iteratures and estimate linear time trends using data prior to 2013 only
i.e. the pre-Airbnb period). We estimate the following two equations at
 neighborhood-time level: 
og ( 𝑌 𝑛,𝑡 ) = 𝜇𝑛 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜌𝑛 × 𝑡 + 𝜖𝑛,𝑡 , for 𝑡 ≤ 2012 (6)
𝑜𝑔( 𝑌 𝑛,𝑡 ) = 𝛽𝐴𝑖𝑟𝑏𝑛𝑏 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝑛,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑋 𝑛,𝑡 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜀 𝑛,𝑡 , for all 𝑡 (7)
The first equation estimates the outcome based on BSA dummies,
ime dummies, and BSA specific linear time trends for the years up to
012. Based on these OLS coefficients, we predict log ( Y n,t ) for the entire
ample years and compute the residuals, ̃𝑙𝑜𝑔( 𝑌 𝑛,𝑡 ) . In the second stage
 Eq. 7 ), we regress these detrended residuals against Airbnb listings,
ime dummies and the time-varying controls ( X n,t ). 23 Distance to the city center is measured as the distance from Plaça Catalunya (the main 




.2. Instrumental variables fixed-effects models 
As an alternative approach to tackle the endogeneity of Airbnb loca-
ion, we also estimate Eq. 5 through a Two-Stage Least Squares regres-
ion. Our theoretical model indicates that short-term rentals locate in
reas where tourist amenities are high. Following this prediction, we use
 shift-share variable as an instrument that combines i) cross-sectional
ariation across BSAs in tourist amenities and ii) aggregate time varia-
ion in Airbnb activity. 
For the cross-sectional ‘share’ component of the instrument, we build
n index that measures proximity to tourist amenities. Our instrument
ims to capture the set of amenities that tourists enjoy while not being
f particular interest to residents. We use TripAdvisor to produce a com-
lete list of the city’s tourist amenities. 24 We geolocate these amenities24 TripAdvisor is a website that offers tourism-related content. According to the site, 
t currently has over 390 million monthly unique visitors. We exclude the more en- 
ogenous and less historical amenities such as areas known for restaurants, bars or 
lubs. 
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Fig. 4. Airbnb activity, tourist amenities and Google Trends searches. Notes: Graph (a) shows BSAs’ Airbnb listings as a function of the tourist amenities index (bins 
are deciles of the tourist amenities distribution). Graph (b) shows the time profile of Airbnb listings (solid line, left axis) and Google Trends searches for ‘Airbnb 





































































26 Before 2008, income is only available for 38 broad neighborhoods nd collect the number of Google reviews of each attraction. We use the
umber of reviews to weight the relative importance of each site. 25 Our
easure of tourist amenities is built as follows: 






here k indicates the amenity, dist n,k is the distance in meters between
he centroid of each BSA n and amenity k , and Reviews k is the number
f Google reviews. Fig. 3 shows the location of these amenities, where
he size of each circle is proportional to the number of reviews. 
As the ‘share’ component of the instrument, the tourist amenities in-
ex should predict where Airbnb listings will appear. Panel a) in Fig. 4
lots this relationship by binning the data for deciles of the tourist in-
ex distribution. The graph clearly shows that BSAs that are closer to
ourist amenities tend to show the highest number of Airbnb listings.
his relationship can be rationalized by the model of Section 2 . Tourist
menities ( A t ) increase the tourists willingness to pay which increases
oth Airbnb prices ( T ) and Airbnb activity ( 𝑏 ∗ 
𝑗 
). In Fig. A.1 in the Ap-
endix, we show that neighborhoods with high levels of Airbnb activity
ave more expensive Airbnb listings. 
Turning to the ‘shift’ component of the instrument, we follow
arron et al. (2020) and use worldwide searches in Google for the term
Airbnb Barcelona’. This variable is measured at a monthly level and is
ormalized to 100 for the month with the highest number of searches.
anel b) of Fig. 4 shows that the number of Google Trends searches for
Airbnb Barcelona’ tracks the time variation in Airbnb activity very well.
The rationale behind the instrument works as follows. The proximity
o tourist amenities predicts where Airbnb listings locate, while searches
n Google Trends for the term ‘Airbnb Barcelona’ predict when listings
ppear. Fig. 4 provides suggestive evidence of the relevance of the in-
trument. We also test for this in the first stage regressions. 
As for the exclusion restriction, recent research on shift-share instru-
ents indicates that the main identification threats are related to the
share’ component of the instrument ( Goldsmith-Pinkham et al., 2020 ).
ince our specifications contain a BSA fixed effect, instrument valid-
ty hinges on the assumption that the cross-sectional ‘share’ component,
roximity to tourist amenities, is only correlated with changes in housing
ents and prices through Airbnb listings. For example, our instrument
ould be invalid if residents’ valuation of proximity to tourist ameni-
ies (or any other BSA characteristic that correlates with it) changes over25 Although TripAdvisor also provides reviews, Google has more. 
t
S
he study period for a reason other than the presence of tourism. If the
nstrument is valid, proximity to tourist amenities should not explain
hanges in housing rents and prices prior to the arrival of Airbnb. We
ddress this issue at length below. 
.3. Event study plots 
We conduct an event study exercise, using the following regressions:
og ( 𝑌 𝑛,𝑡 ) = 
∑
𝑡 ≠2012 
𝛿𝑡 × 𝐴𝑖𝑟𝑏𝑛𝑏𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝑛, 2016 + 𝛾𝑋 𝑛,𝑡 + 𝜇𝑛 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜀 𝑛,𝑡 (9)
here AirbnbCount n ,2016 is the number of listings in BSA n in 2016. Like
n previous regressions, we include time and BSA fixed effects and time-
arying characteristics ( X n,t ). We estimate AirbnbCount n ,2016 × year
nteractions, leaving 2012 as the base year. This approach allows us to
stimate the yearly effect of having one additional listing in 2016. Again,
e choose 2012 as the last pre-Airbnb year as, starting in 2013, Airbnb’s
ctivity became more significant. This exercise allows us to check if,
rior to the arrival of Airbnb, areas that will experience higher Airbnb
ctivity display similar trends in housing rents and prices compared to
ther neighborhoods. 
.4. Evidence from Sagrada Familia 
In our last empirical strategy, we will focus on Sagrada Familia , one of
he main tourist amenities in the city. It is one of the three major tourist
menities not found in the city centre as shown in Fig. 3 . The other
wo non-central hotspots are Camp Nou (north-west of city centre) and
arc Güell (north-west of Sagrada Familia ). Fig. 2 shows that only the
rea around Sagrada Familia has a high level of Airbnb activity, possibly
ecause Camp Nou and Parc Güell are too far from the city centre. Unlike
he most central parts of the city, the area around Sagrada Familia is
n upper-middle class residential neighborhood. In 2000, this area was
anked 14 out of 38 broad neighborhoods by relative family income 26 .
ts position in this ranking was 13 in 2008, indicating that this area
as not experiencing gentrification in the pre-Airbnb period 27 Sagrada27 Similarly, the share of population between 20 and 34 years, which is another indica- 
or associated with gentrification, has also remained stable over the same period in the 
agrada Familia area. It was equivalent to 26% in 2000 and to 27% in 2008. 
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Fig. 5. Evolution of rents and prices for High Airbnb Area vs. the rest. Notes: Rents, Transaction and Posted prices are expressed in logs. Graphs plot raw averages 










































amilia provides us a setting to study the effects of short-term rentals
here concerns regarding the confounding effects of urban revival are
iluted. 
First, we estimate Eq. 5 by Two-Stage Least Squares where the instru-
ent is the interaction term between the inverse distance to Sagrada Fa-
ilia (1/ distSF n ) and our measure of Google Trends searches. In this case,
roximity to this particular attraction predicts the location of Airbnb
istings, while, as before, Google Trends predicts the timing of Airbnb
rrival and expansion. We argue that this is an exogenous instrument
ince it is unlikely that residents’ preferences to locate close to Sagrada
amilia had change during the period 2007–2017 for a reason other than
ourism. 
Second, we also replicate our event-study design but focus on the
roximity to Sagrada Familia as a predictor of Airbnb activity. We es-
imate 1/ distSF n × year interactions, while controlling for the usual
eighborhood characteristics and fixed effects. 






+ 𝛾𝑋 𝑛,𝑡 + 𝜇𝑛 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜀 𝑛,𝑡 (10)
This strategy is useful to determine whether BSAs at different dis-
ances (measured in kilometers) to Sagrada Familia experience similar
rends in rents and prices before and after the arrival of Airbnb. . Main results 
.1. Graphical evidence 
Before proceeding to the regression results, in Fig. 5 , we show graph-
cal evidence of the effect of Airbnb on housing markets. We plot raw av-
rage (log) prices and rents series over time for High Airbnb Areas (BSAs
n the top decile of Airbnb listings distribution in 2016) versus the rest.
n Panel (a) we graph rents, while in Panels (b) and (c), we show corre-
ponding graphs for transaction prices and posted prices, respectively.
or completeness, in Panel (d), we plot our measure of Airbnb activity.
The levels of both rents and prices tend to be higher in BSAs with
ore Airbnb activity. While the series for the period before 2012 ap-
ear fairly parallel, the gaps in rents and prices seem to widen, with the
xpansion of Airbnb in 2013 and onwards, especially for rents and trans-
ction prices, where the divergence is more noticeable. In the first three
gures, the difference between the two groups is statistically significant
t the end of the period, while this is not the case for the first years.
inally, in Panel (d), we report the evolution of the count of Airbnb
istings by group. While the number of listings increased drastically for
he High Airbnb Areas , the increase was very modest for the other BSAs,
eflecting fact that Airbnb is highly concentrated in particular areas of
he city. 
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Table 3 
Impact of Airbnb on rents and prices - Baseline Specifications. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Panel A Rents 
Airbnb Count (x100) 0.036 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.035 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.037 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.036 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.058 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.051 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.034 ∗ 0.038 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.053 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.020) (0.024) (0.018) (0.008) (0.010) 
N 2.123 2.123 2.123 2.123 2.123 2.123 2.123 2.123 1.920 
Panel B Transaction Prices 
Airbnb Count (x100) 0.110 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.085 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.039 ∗ ∗ 0.040 ∗ ∗ 0.052 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.062 ∗ ∗ 0.082 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.063 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.084 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.019) (0.016) (0.017) (0.018) (0.020) (0.025) (0.025) (0.017) (0.022) 
N 7.901 7.901 7.901 7.901 7.901 7.901 7.901 7.901 7.228 
Panel C Posted Prices 
Airbnb Count (x100) 0.081 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.068 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.032 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.026 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.022 0.005 0.084 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.045 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.075 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.019) (0.023) (0.21) (0.010) (0.012) 
N 2.229 2.229 2.229 2.229 2.229 2.229 2.229 2.229 2.024 
Time FE X X X X X X X X X 
BSA FE X X X X X X X X X 
Controls - X X X X X X X X 
Trends - - X n ,2012 (L) X n ,2012 (Q) BSA (L) BSA (Q) - - - 
Detrendend BSA - - - - - - X - - 
X n ,2012 × GDP - - - - - - - X - 
No Hist Dist - - - - - - - - X 
Notes: Significance is indicated by ∗ p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, and ∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered at the BSA level. Each column represents a 
different specification. Panel A reports the results for rents, while Panels B and C report the corresponding estimates for transaction and posted prices. Outcomes are 
average residuals at the BSA-time period level, as explained in the main text. Regressions weighted with the total number of ads (for rents and posted prices) and 
of transactions (for prices). The analysis takes place at the BSA-year level for rents and posted prices and BSA-quarter for transaction prices. Controls are: average 
age, log of population density, average household size, unemployment rate, average relative income, and percentage of foreign residents. Trends can be either 






































Impact of Airbnb on the number of households, household size and population. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A Outcome: log(Number of Households) 
Airbnb Count (x100) -0.014 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0.024 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0.010 ∗ -0.007 ∗ ∗ 
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) 
Panel B Outcome: log(Household Size) 
Airbnb Count (x100) -0.002 -0.018 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0.009 ∗ 0.004 
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Panel C Outcome: log(Population) 
Airbnb Count (x100) -0.016 ∗ -0.043 ∗ ∗ ∗ -0.020 ∗ ∗ 0.002 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.004) 
N 2056 2056 2056 2056 
Time FE X X X X 
BSA FE X X X X 
Controls - X X X 
Time Trends - - X n ,2012 (L) BSA (L) 
Notes: Significance is indicated by ∗ p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, and ∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01. Standard 
errors, in parentheses, are clustered at the BSA level. Each cell represents a 
different regression with the log the number of households (panel A), the log 
of household size (panel B) and the log of population (panel C). The analysis 
takes place at the BSA-year level for the period 2009–2017. Controls are average 
age, unemployment rate, average relative income, and percentage of foreign 
residents. Linear trends can be either characteristic-specific ( X n ,2012 (L)) or BSA- 












t  These graphs are suggestive evidence that neighborhoods with
igher Airbnb penetration also experienced higher rents and price
rowth with the arrival and expansion of Airbnb. Since these series
ight be affected by other confounding factors that could be biasing the
esults, we move to our main empirical strategies described in Section 4 .
.2. Baseline results 
In Table 3 , we report our baseline results for the impact of Airbnb
n rents (Panel A) and prices (Panels B and C). As explained above,
hroughout the table, the dependent variable is the average BSA-time
eriod residual of a micro regression in which log rents (or log prices)
re regressed on housing characteristics and time dummies. 
In column 1, we regress the outcome of interest against the number
f Airbnb listings while controlling only for time and BSA-fixed effects.
hen, in column 2, we add BSA time-varying controls. Coefficients are
ositive and significant for both rents and prices, which implies that an
ncrease in the number of listings translates into an increase in rents and
rices. The effects on prices are larger than on rents, especially for trans-
ction prices. The presence of contemporaneous controls has no large
mpact on the estimates for rents, while it slightly decreases coefficients
or prices, although not in a statistically significant way. Nevertheless,
e keep the socioeconomic controls in subsequent specifications for the
ake of completeness. 
In column 3 (4), we include socioeconomic-specific linear (or
uadratic) time trends by introducing interaction terms between a linear
or quadratic) time trend and the control variables measured in 2012 as
etailed in Section 4 . The coefficients for prices are somewhat reduced,
hile they remain fairly constant for rents. Then, we report the results of
pecifications that fit BSA-specific time trends. Column 5 shows the re-
ults for linear trends and the results for quadratic trends are presented
n column 6. These allow for both observable and unobservable char-
cteristics to impact neighborhood trends. The inclusion of linear time
rends increases the coefficient for rents (though not significantly) and
educes the coefficients for prices, especially for posted prices where the
oefficient becomes non-significant. As for regressions with quadratic
rends, they do not substantially change the coefficients of rents and
ransaction prices but it further decreases the coefficient for postedrices. Nevertheless, by introducing quadratic trends we might be over-
tting the model as a vast majority of the BSA quadratic trend coef-
cients are non-significant. For posted prices, where results are more
ensitive to the inclusion of quadratic trends, the F-test of their joint
ignificance is only 1.60. 
As mentioned before, one caveat of this approach is that if Airbnb
mpacts rent and price trends rather than levels, the BSA fixed effects
ill absorb part of the Airbnb effect on the outcomes. In column 7, we
epeat the analysis after detrending the data following the procedure
escribed in Section 4 . In a first step, the pre-Airbnb data are used to es-
imate BSA-specific time trends, which are then used to detrend all data
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Table 5 
Impact of Airbnb on rents and prices: IV regressions. 
First Stage Second Stage First Stage Second Stage 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A Rents 
Airbnb Count (x100) 0.022 ∗ ∗ 0.033 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.011) (0.010) 
TouristAmenities × GoogleTrends 0.005 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.005 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.000) (0.001) 
N 2.123 2.123 2.123 2.123 
F-stat. excl. inst. 192.2 70.2 
Panel B Transaction Prices 
Airbnb Count (x100) 0.123 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.104 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.020) (0.023) 
TouristAmenities × GoogleTrends 0.004 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.003 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.000) (0.000) 
N 7.228 7.228 7.228 7.228 
F-stat. excl. inst. 217.8 61.3 
Panel C Posted Prices 
Airbnb Count (x100) 0.074 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.047 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.014) (0.013) 
TouristAmenities × GoogleTrends 0.005 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.005 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.000) (0.001) 
N 2.229 2.229 2.229 2.229 
F-stat. excl. inst. 159.0 70.5 
Time FE X X X X 
BSA FE X X X X 
Controls X X X X 
X n ,2012 × GDP - - X X 
Notes: Significance is indicated by ∗ p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, and ∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered at the BSA 
level. Panel A reports the results for rents, while Panels B and C report the corresponding estimates for transaction and posted prices. 
Outcomes are average residuals at the BSA-time period level, as explained in the main text. Regressions weighted with the total 
number of ads (for rents and posted prices) and of transactions (for prices). The analysis takes place at the BSA-year level for rents 
and posted prices and BSA-quarter for transaction prices. Controls are: average age, log of population density, average household 
size, unemployment rate, average relative income, and percentage of foreign residents. X n ,2012 × GDP also includes distance to city 




























































c  oints. Here, the coefficient for rents slightly decreases and gets closer
o the specifications reported in columns 1 and 2. For prices, they both
ncrease with respect to columns 3 to 6, and their magnitude becomes
ore similar to each other. While these estimates provide yet another
obustness test of the results, we acknowledge that the pre-Airbnb pe-
iod is admittedly short to reliably estimate the pre-trends needed to
etrend the post-Airbnb data. 
The arrival and expansion of Airbnb coincides with the period of
conomic recovery that started in 2013. One concern is that economic
rowth might have impacted rents and prices differently across the city.
n column 8, we add an interaction term between each control variable
n 2012 (including the distance to the city centre) with the log of re-
ional GDP. This allows us to control for areas reacting differently to
conomic growth. Our coefficients are still positive, strongly significant
nd of a similar magnitude after this inclusion. Finally, in a last sensitiv-
ty test, we also show that our findings are not driven by neighborhoods
n the historical city center ( Ciutat Vella ), characterised by very high
evels of Airbnb activity. The results reported in column 9 show that
oefficients are still significant and of a similar magnitude after BSAs in
he more central parts of the city are excluded. 
To interpret the economic size of the estimated effects, we focus on
he results in column 2. At face value, our estimates imply that an in-
rease in 100 Airbnb listings in a given neighbourhood translates to in-
reases of 3.5% in rents, 8.5% in transaction prices and 6.8% in posted
rices. Given that the average increase in Airbnb activity in the period
012–2016 is of 54 listings, our estimates imply an average increases of
.89% in rents, 4.59% in transaction prices and 3.67% in posted prices.
The large degree of heterogeneity in Airbnb activity across BSAs
mplies that Airbnb has not affected all neighborhoods equally. In
ig. A.2 in the Appendix we illustrate these heterogeneous impacts bylotting the result of multiplying the coefficients obtained in column 2
y the Airbnb activity of each BSA in 2016. While the implied effects
re very close to zero for the less central BSAs, our estimates imply some
ocal impacts that are substantial. For the High Airbnb Areas , Airbnb has
ncreased rents, transaction prices and posted prices by an average of
%, 17% and 14%, respectively. 
Across the different specifications, the results indicate that higher
irbnb penetration leads to increases in both rents and prices, with the
ffects on prices being larger than on rents. These results are an empir-
cal test of the predictions of our theoretical model of Section 2 . The
esults suggest that the net effect of Airbnb activity positively affects
ents and prices, which implies that the possible negative externalities
ssociated with Airbnb do not offset its inflationary effects. Since hous-
ng units that are on Airbnb yield, on average, a higher return than
hose units that are rented to residents, the housing price increase due
o Airbnb exceeds that of long-term rents. 
The results of specifications with BSA-specific linear time trends in
olumn 5 are close to those reported in column 2, which corresponds
o a more parsimonious specification with BSA and time fixed effects
nd time-varying control variables. Overall, we consider the estimates
n column 2 as our baseline results for two reasons. First, the time pe-
iod before the expansion of Airbnb (i.e., ≤ 2012) might be too short to
btain robust estimates of BSA-specific time trends. Second, and most
mportantly, the event-study exercises shown below indicate that the
arallel trends assumption holds before 2013, suggesting that specifica-
ions that fit neighborhood specific time trends are unnecessary. 
Finally, we perform a formal test á la Oster to assess the robust-
ess of the results to omitted variable bias. The method, developed by
ster (2019) and inspired by Altonji et al. (2005) , analyzes how the in-
lusion of controls changes the coefficient of interest and the R-squared
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Fig. 6. Event-study graph for rents and prices Notes: Outcome variables Rents, Transaction and Posted prices are expressed in logs. Event-study regressions following 


































f the main regression. If including controls increases the predictive ca-
acity of the model while not affecting the coefficient of interest, it is less
ikely that including unobservables would bias the results. One way to
ssess this potential bias is to compute the relative importance of unob-
ervables to observables ( 𝛿) that would be consistent with a coefficient
f interest equal to zero ( 𝛽 = 0 ). This is equivalent to asking how impor-
ant the unobservables would need to be relative to the observables to
liminate the estimated effect. 
For our baseline specification (column 2 in Table 3 ), the 𝛿 that
atches 𝛽 = 0 amounts to 6.77 for rents, 1.41 for transaction prices and
9.7 for posted prices. 28 It means that the importance of unobservables
ould have to be 6.8, 1.4 and 39.7 times higher than that of the observ-
bles for the coefficients to be null. These high values occur because
ontrols have a very large explanatory power while their inclusion has
 small influence on our Airbnb coefficients. This exercise indicates that
oncerns about omitted variables bias are limited since the values of 𝛿28 We compare a constrained specification (with time dummies only) with an un- 
onstrained specification which also includes BSA fixed effects and all the time 
arying controls at the BSA level ( X n,t ). As proposed by Oster (2019) , we set 
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re larger than one. This also suggests that gentrification is unlikely to
xplain the bulk of our effects. 
.3. Alternative Airbnb measures 
In this subsection, we show that the results are robust to alterna-
ive measures of Airbnb activity. So far, our measure of Airbnb activity
eflected contemporaneous activity. Each BSA-time cell is matched to
he number of Airbnb listings that received a review in that particular
uarter. In column 2 of Table A.1 in the Appendix, we consider a specifi-
ation in which Airbnb activity is measured over a longer time window.
ach BSA-time cell is matched to a moving average (MA) measure of
irbnb activity that averages contemporaneous activity with that of the
revious three quarters (AbnbCount MA). The purpose of this measure
s to take into account Airbnb seasonality. 
Although the BSAs are relatively similar in size, we compute a mea-
ure of Airbnb density by dividing the number of listings over the total
umber of housing units (column 3). Finally, in column 4, we take the
og of the number of Airbnb listings to reproduce the log-log specifica-
ion used by Barron et al. (2020) . The last row of Table A.1 provides the
verage of each of the alternative measures of Airbnb activity to ease
omparability across estimates. 
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Fig. 7. Event-study graph for rents and prices using inverse distance to Sagrada Familia Notes: Outcome variables Rents, Transaction and Posted prices are expressed 






































n  Overall, our findings are robust to using alternative measures of
irbnb activity. Despite the underlying differences between the two
tudies, our results (reported in column 4) are similar in magnitude to
arron et al. (2020) for the US. They find that a 1% increase in Airbnb
istings increases housing rents and prices by 0.018% and 0.026%,
espectively. Our estimates are a bit lower for rents (0.0098), while
arron et al. (2020) ’s estimate for housing prices is in between our es-
imates for posted prices (0.017) and transaction prices (0.031). 
.4. Mechanisms 
As explained in the theoretical model of Section 2 , the impact of
irbnb on rents comes from the reduction of long-term rental supply
aused by owner choice to shift to short-term rentals. To provide di-
ect evidence of this mechanism, we would ideally look at the number
f units rented to residents. Since this data is not available, we examine
nstead the number of households, which includes both owner-occupiers
nd tenant households. 29 We also assess the impact on population and
ousehold size, where the latter is computed as the ratio between popu-29 Alternatively, we could look at the number of signed rental agreements from official 
ecords. However, this information is not provided at the BSA level but at the district level 
nd only starts in 2013. 
a  
m
ation and the number of households. We argue that, while a gentrifica-
ion process might reduce population and household size of the gentri-
ying neighborhood, as new incoming households are richer and have a
ower average household size, it should not reduce the number of house-
olds in the neighborhood. Gentrifying processes revitalise neighbour-
oods by attracting more households. 
In Table 4 , we report the results of running specifications 1, 2, 3
nd 5 of Table 3 on the three different outcomes. The results of Panel A
ndicate that Airbnb listings have a negative and strongly significant ef-
ect on the number of households across all four specifications. If we
ocus on column 2, the estimates imply that 100 Airbnb listings de-
rease the number of households by 2.4%. On the contrary, Panels B
nd C show Airbnb’s negative effect on household size and population on
hree of the four specifications. We can decompose the effect of Airbnb
n population into the number of households plus the effect on house-
old size. 30 Then, we can compute how much of the reduction in pop-
lation is due to a reduction in the number of households or due to a
ower average household size. In columns 1 to 3, the contribution of the
umber of households to the reduction in population is of 88%, 56%
nd 50%, respectively. In column 4, Airbnb only has a significant effect30 The fact that 𝑝𝑜𝑝 𝑛 = ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙 𝑑𝑠 𝑛 × ( 𝑝𝑜𝑝 𝑛 ∕ ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙 𝑑𝑠 𝑛 ) , combined with outcomes are 
easured in logs allows for this decomposition. 
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Table 6 
Impact of Airbnb on rents and prices: IV estimates Sagrada Familia . 
Rents Transaction Prices Posted Prices 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Airbnb Ln(Rent) Airbnb Ln(Prices) Airbnb Ln(Prices) 
Airbnb Count (x100) 0.095 ∗ ∗ 0.120 ∗ ∗ 0.101 ∗ ∗ 
(0.038) (0.052) (0.044) 
Inv Dist SF × GoogleTrends 0.733 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.452 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.686 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.197) (0.112) (0.193) 
N 2.138 2.138 7.916 7.916 2.247 2.247 
Time FE X X X X X X 
BSA FE X X X X X X 
Controls X X X X X X 
F-stat of exc. inst. 13.8 16.3 12.5 
Notes: Significance is indicated by ∗ p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, and ∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered at the BSA level. 
Each column represents a different specification. Panel A reports the results for rents, while Panels B and C report the corresponding 
estimates for transaction and posted prices. Outcomes are average residuals at the BSA-time period level, as explained in the main 
text. Regressions weighted with the total number of ads (for rents and posted prices) and of transactions (for prices). The analysis 
takes place at the BSA-year level for rents and posted prices and BSA-quarter for transaction prices. Controls are: average age, log of 














































































n the number of households, suggesting again that Airbnb displaces
esidents. 
Overall, these results strongly support the hypothesis that the
hannel behind the impact of Airbnb on housing prices is a supply
eduction of long-term rentals. The results also lend credibility to the
ypothesis that the increases in housing rents and prices that we esti-
ate are caused by Airbnb activity and not by ongoing gentrification
rocesses. 
. Results for alternative empirical strategies 
.1. Instrumental variables results 
In Table 5 , we report first and second-stage results of the instrumen-
al variables approach described in Section 4.2 . Columns 2 and 4 report
he second-stage results for rents, transaction prices and posted prices,
espectively. The specification corresponds to Eq. 5 , where Airbnb ac-
ivity is instrumented with the interaction between the cross-sectional
ourist amenities index ( Eq. 8 ) and the Google Trend searches. In
olumns 1 and 2, we control for BSA and time fixed effects as well as the
sual control variables; in columns 3 and 4, we also include the interac-
ion term between the control variables in 2012 (including distance to
he city center) and the regional GDP level. 31 
Columns 1 and 3 report the first-stage coefficients. To test the rele-
ance of the instrument we provide the F-test of excluded instruments
hich is well above 10, the standard rule of thumb accepted by prac-
itioners ( Angrist and Pischke, 2008 ). The instrument is not weak and
redicts well when and where Airbnb listings appear. Moving to the
econd-stage results, the coefficients remain positive and statistically
ignificant at the 1% significance level. In terms of magnitude, coef-
cients in column 2 are remarkably similar to their OLS counterparts
f column 2 in Table 3 , although admittedly the estimated coefficient
or transaction prices is larger (although not in a statistically significant
ense). As for column 4, the inclusion of interaction terms with GDP
ncreases the coefficient of rents while it decreases the coefficients of
rices, just like in Table 3 . One concern regarding instrument validity
ight be that a large fraction of tourist amenities are located at the
ity center. The fact that our results remain stable with the inclusion of
istance to the city center times GDP provides evidence that our IV esti-
ates are not biased by a shift in preferences for the city center among
esidents during the recovery period. 31 These specifications correspond to columns 2 and 8 of Table 3 . 
 
f  According to Goldsmith-Pinkham et al. (2020) , when discussing the
xogeneity of a shift-share instrument, attention should be paid to the
share’ component of the instrument. In our case, the main concern is
hat BSAs that are close to tourist amenities could be experiencing dif-
erent trends in housing rents and/or prices for reasons unrelated to
irbnb. 
To provide some evidence of the exogeneity of our instrument, we
un event-study regressions (as in Eq. 9 ) where we interact year dum-
ies with an indicator variable for BSAs in the top decile of the tourist
ndex distribution. This exercise attempts to verify whether BSAs that
re closer to relevant tourist amenities were experiencing a different
rend in rents and prices before the arrival of Airbnb. Panel (a) of
ig. A.3 in the Appendix shows that, before 2013, pretrends in rents
ere not statistically different between the two groups. In 2014, co-
nciding with the expansion of Airbnb, the difference becomes signifi-
ant. The results are similar in Panels (b) and (c), hence lending cred-
bility to the exogeneity hypothesis of our instrument. The results of
he IV strategy provide a solid robustness test of the validity of our
nstrumental variables results. The fact that coefficients remain fairly
imilar and equally significant helps diminishing potential endogeneity
oncerns. 
.2. Event-study regression results 
In this subsection, we report the results of the event study regressions
 Eq. 9 in Section 4.3 ). Fig. 6 plots the coefficients of the interaction
erms between Airbnb activity in 2016 and the year dummies for rents
a), transaction prices (b) and posted prices (c), where the coefficients
n 2012 have been normalized to zero. 
The interaction terms between 2016 Airbnb activity (times 100) and
ear dummies are statistically insignificant before 2013, while they are
ositive and significant starting in 2014. This indicates that, at the be-
inning of the period, when the number of Airbnb listings was low, rents
nd prices were not evolving differently in the BSAs that after 2013
ad high Airbnb activity. In contrast, between 2014 and 2017, when
irbnb’s presence became important, neighborhoods where Airbnb ac-
ivity was concentrated started to experience higher rents and price
rowth. In a robustness test that is reported in Fig. A.4 in the Appendix,
e show that the results are robust to using a binary measure of Airbnb
ctivity in 2016, where BSAs are classified into High Airbnb Areas and
ther areas. 
The coefficients in Fig. 6 can be interpreted as follows: an increase
rom zero to 100 listings in 2016 increases rents by 3.8%, transaction



























































Baseline ∗ AbnbCount MA ∗ AbnbDens log AbnbCount 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A Rents 
Airbnb 0.035 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.029 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.0068 0.0098 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.009) (0.008) (0.005) (0.003) 
N 2.123 2.123 2.123 2.123 
Panel B Transaction Prices 
Airbnb 0.085 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.086 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.030 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.031 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.016) (0.021) (0.005) (0.006) 
N 7.916 7.916 7.916 7.916 
Panel C Posted Prices 
Airbnb 0.068 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.070 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.019 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.017 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.009) (0.010) (0.004) (0.004) 
N 2.229 2.229 2.229 2.229 
Time FE X X X X 
BSA FE X X X X 
Controls X X X X 
Mean 4Q2016 56 49 1.57% 1.76 
Notes: Significance is indicated by ∗ p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, and ∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01. Stan- 
dard errors, in parentheses, are clustered at the BSA level. Panel A reports the 
results for rents, while Panels B and C report the corresponding estimates for 
transaction and posted prices. ∗ In the case of Baseline and AbnbCount MA, the 
coefficients are multiplied by 100. Outcomes are average residuals at the BSA- 
time period level. Regressions are weighted with the total number of ads (for 
rents and posted prices) or transactions (for prices). The analysis takes place at 
the BSA-year level for rents and posted prices and BSA-quarter level for prices. 
Controls are average age, the log of population density, average household size, 
unemployment rate, average income, and percentage of foreign residents. 
Fig. A.1. Airbnb Activity and Airbnb Prices. Notes: The graphs shows deciles 
of BSAs with respect to their mean Airbnb Count for the fourth quarter of 2016 
ordered in the y axis. For each decile the mean log Airbnb nightly price for those 
active listings is shown in the x axis. rices by 6.2% and posted prices by 5.6% in that year. These magnitudes
re broadly in line with our baseline estimates of Table 3 . 
.3. Sagrada Familia results 
Finally, in this sub-section we report the Sagrada Familia results.
able 6 displays the first and second-stage results of estimating Eq. 5 us-
ng the interaction between proximity to Sagrada Familia and the Google
rend searches as an instrument. 
Columns 1, 3 and 5 report the first stage where our instrument
s positively and significantly associated with Airbnb activity, which
uggests that the instrument is relevant. The F-statistics of excluded
nstruments are high, which reinforces our claim. Columns 2, 4 and
 report the second-stage results where the coefficients are positive,
tatistically significant and of a relatively higher magnitude than in
ur previous regressions, although not in a statistically significant way.
nce again, the results of this exercise point in the same direction,
ndicating that Airbnb activity had an impact on both rents and prices in
arcelona. 
Finally, Fig. 7 depicts the results of running an event-study regres-
ion using proximity to Sagrada Familia as a predictor of Airbnb activity.
hile the results are less conclusive in this exercise, we can nevertheless
bserve a similar trend than in the previous event-study where coeffi-
ients become positive and significant in 2015. This is true especially
or rents and for posted prices. Yet again, this last strategy suggest that
irbnb had an inflationary effect on housing markets. 
. Concluding remarks 
The rapid expansion of urban tourism and short-term rentals have
ecently garnered much interest in public opinion and among policy-
akers, especially in large tourist cities. Concerns about the potential
egative consequences of these phenomena have led local administra-
ions to apply a wide range of regulatory measures. 
To study how Airbnb affects the city’s housing markets, we examine
igh-quality microdata on both rents and prices and combine these data
ith information on the location of Airbnb activity within the city. We
pply several regression-based approaches that exploit the timing and
eography of the entry of Airbnb in the city to estimate the effects of
his platform on the city’s housing markets. The results show that Airbnb
ctivity in Barcelona has led to an increase both in rents and housing
rices, with larger effects for prices than for rents. Our preferred results
ndicate that, for a neighborhood with the average Airbnb activity in
he city, rents have increased by 1.9%, while transaction prices have
ncreased by 4.6% and posted prices by 3.7%. 
Although the effects on rents are not small, they cannot explain the
ulk of the high aggregate increases in rents that the city has experi-
nced between 2012 and 2016. In the most touristic parts of the city,
he effects of Airbnb are substantial. In neighborhoods in the top decile
f the Airbnb activity distribution, rents are estimated to have increased
y as much as 7%, while increases in transaction and posted prices are
s high as 17% and 14%, respectively. 
Short-term rental platforms such as Airbnb might worsen the hous-
ng affordability problem in cities such as Barcelona, where tourism is
opular and the difference in profitability between renting long-term to
esidents or short-term to tourists is high. Our findings can contribute to
 more informed debate about the consequences of Airbnb and the desir-
bility and design of policies that aim to limit the size of the short-term
ental market. ppendix A 
able A.1 
mpact of Airbnb on rents and prices: Robustness checks. 
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Fig. A.2. Implied effects of Airbnb across BSAs. Notes: These maps plot the implied impacts of Airbnb on rents and on transaction (posted) prices. For this we take 
the results reported in column 2 of Table 3 , and multiply it by Airbnb activity in each BSA at 2016. 
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Fig. A.3. Instrument pretrend analysis. Notes: Outcome variables Rents, Transaction and Posted prices are expressed in logs. Event-study regressions where we 
interact year dummies with an indicator variable for BSAs in the top decile of the tourist index distribution. 
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Fig. A.4. Event-study graph for rents and prices (top decile). Notes: This graph plots coefficient estimates (and confidence intervals) as in Eq. 9 but the continuous 
measure of Airbnb activity has been replaced by a dummy variable for the top decile. Regressions are weighted with total number of ads (for rents) and of transactions 
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Supplementary material associated with this article can be found, in
he online version, at doi: 10.1016/j.jue.2020.103278 . 
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